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POST-EXPIRY PATENT LOSSES: RECOVERABLE, BUT UNPREVENTABLE? 
 
Kiernan A. Murphy* 
 
 
Liability for patent infringement is statutorily limited to the term of the 
patent.  However nothing limits recovery to losses suffered during that same 
term.  Since patent infringement is tort-like in many respects, traditional 
damages principles apply to quantify damages suffered after the expiry of the 
patent.  Recent Canadian and English case law has indicated a willingness to 
consider such recovery.  Consequently, the courts may be far less willing to 
grant springboarding injunctions.  Patentees seeking to prevent 
springboarders must satisfy the tripartite interlocutory injunction test, which 
requires demonstration of irreparable harm.  Since post-expiry losses may 
now be considered quantifiable and recoverable, a patentee will seldom 
demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable harm.  This article argues that 
losses suffered after a patent has expired due to pre-expiry infringement of 
that patent are recoverable and that the recoverability of post-expiry patent 
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losses will all but preclude the availability of interlocutory injunctions to 
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The Patent Act (the “Act”) protects patentees for almost the 
full life of the patent, which in Canada is twenty years from the date 
it is filed.1  During the term of the patent, the patentee has the 
exclusive right of “making, constructing, using the invention and 
selling it to others.”2  Since the patentee can only claim relief under 
the statute for a patent infringement – in other words a violation of 
the patentee‟s exclusive rights in relation to a patented product – this 
seems on its face to protect the patentee solely during the term of the 
patent.3 
                                                          
1 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s.44 [Act]. 
2 Act, supra note 1, s.42. 
3 Act, supra note 1, s.55. 
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However, it is clear that the benefit of patent protection may 
extend beyond the term of the patent.  In a classic English patent case, 
the House of Lords recognized that, at least in some industries, in that 
case medical technologies, “the benefit of the monopoly granted by 
the patent derives from the fact that the patented product is given the 
opportunity of becoming established and this benefit continues to be 
reaped after the patent has expired.”4  Although this statement was 
made in the context of a new pharmaceutical product used exclusively 
by doctors which, as the court noted, takes a long time to become 
established in the market, most patents will provide some benefit 
post-expiry.  In fact, the question is merely one of degree.  
Further, it is readily conceivable that actions occurring during 
the life of the patent may have repercussions on this post-expiry 
benefit.  For example, a competitor‟s early access to the market might 
impair the patentee‟s capacity to compete with the infringing 
competitor once the patent has expired, whereas the two may have 
co-existed competitively had the infringement not occurred.  This 
early market access provides the infringer with a springboard, or a 
head start, into the unpatented commercial arena. 
This Article argues that losses suffered after a patent has 
expired due to pre-expiry infringement of that patent are recoverable.  
Nothing in the Act suggests that recovery is limited to losses suffered 
during the term of the patent.  Further, traditional tort liability 
principles are applicable and well-suited to assess losses suffered due 
to patent infringement, which is itself tort-like. 
This Article further argues that the recoverability of post-
expiry patent losses will all but preclude the availability of 
interlocutory injunctions to restrain springboard infringement.  
Interlocutory injunctions, ordered only where the harm suffered will 
be irreparable – unquantifiable or unrecoverable – are seldom granted 
in patent cases because infringement losses are often commercial in 
nature and thus quantifiable and recoverable.  Losses occurring after 
the term of the patent are generally assumed to be unrecoverable and 
therefore potentially irreparable.  The recoverability of such losses 
effectively removes them from the ambit of irreparable harm except 
in special circumstances and thus further hinders patentees seeking to 
restrain springboarding infringement before trial.  
                                                          
4 American Cyanamid v. Ethicon, [1975] AC 396 (HL). 
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Initially, the springboard concept was considered within the 
context of a breach of confidential information.  In Cadbury Scheppes 
Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., the Supreme Court of Canada cited another old 
English case to the effect that “a person who has obtained information 
in confidence is not allowed to use it as a spring-board for activities 
detrimental to the person who made the confidential 
communication.”5  In International Corona Resources Ltd. v. Lac 
Minerals Ltd., both the majority and the minority agreed that the 
confidential information was the springboard that led to the benefit, 
in that case a very valuable plot of land.6 
However, springboarding has now evolved to include patent 
infringement before the expiry of the patent as a means to achieve 
more rapid market penetration: 
 
Springboarding refers to a competitor establishing a generic 
brand in the market in advance of the expiry of the 
innovator‟s patent.  Early entry into the marketplace allows 
the competitor to „ramp up‟ and achieve a share of market 
penetration prior to the expiration of the patent in issue.7 
 
The issue in such a case is the consequences of the 
infringement after the patent expires.  It is clear that a patentee can 
request relief for the infringement itself.  It is not so clear whether 
any post-expiry loss can be claimed.  However, surely such losses do 
                                                          
5 Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 142 at para.67.  Roger T. 
Hughes and Dino P. Clarizio, Hughes and Woodley on Patents, 2d ed. (Toronto: 
LexisNexis, 2008) at para. 103 [Hughes and Clarizio]. set out a similar definition: 
“Where knowledge was in fact available to the public and could be collected by 
someone having sufficient time and desire to do so, without violating any obligation 
as to secrecy, nonetheless in instances where effort has been expended in acquiring 
and collecting such knowledge which was then turned over to a person for a limited 
purpose, the Courts will restrain that person from using the knowledge for another 
purpose.” 
6 International Corona Resources Ltd. v. Lac Minerals Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574. 
7 Bayer Healthcare AG v. Sandoz Canada Inc., 2007 FC 352 at para. 51 [Bayer 
Healthcare].  See also Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Apotex Inc. (2001) 15 C.P.R. (4th) 
190 at para. 16 (F.C.T.D.) [Bristol-Meyers Squibb]: “„Springboarding‟, as the plaintiffs 
use that term, refers to Apotex establishing its generic brand in the market in advance 
of expiry of plaintiffs' patent, by marketing its product and obtaining formulary 
listings across Canada. An early entry or „ramp up‟ into to the market allows Apotex 
early „market penetration‟, before expiry of the patent in suit.” 
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arise.8  If, as mentioned previously, patent protection entitles 
patentees to establish their position in the market prior to the expiry 
of their patent, and springboarding allows a competitor to achieve 
more rapid market penetration, in other words to circumvent the 
patentees established position, prima facie patentees would seem to 
lose a benefit that they are entitled to under patent law. The question 
is whether Canadian patent law does in fact protect the patentee 
against such post-expiry losses. 
The issue of losses occurring after the expiry of the patent 
arises in three different ways.  First, an infringement action may be 
brought subsequent to the expiry of the patent.  Post-expiry losses will 
therefore comprise two components: known, or estimated, losses 
already having occurred and future losses.  The Act, however, grants 
relief only for infringements committed less than six years prior to the 
commencement of the action9 and therefore this scenario has a 
limited window of occurrence.  Second, the action could be tried 
subsequent to the expiry of the patent despite the fact that the action 
was launched during the life of the patent.  Post-expiry losses would 
comprise the same two components as in the first scenario.  Third, 
patentees may enforce the patent during its term, with the trial of the 
action occurring before the expiry of the patent.  At the time of trial, 
no post-expiry losses will have been suffered as the patent is still 
within its term, and thus all post-expiry losses would be future losses.  
Before considering the potential recovery of post-expiry 
patent losses, some terminology should be defined.  In Canada, the act 
of infringing a patent in order to better one‟s position after the patent 
expires is generally referred to as springboarding.  It often involves an 
infringement shortly before the expiry of the patent rather than early 
in the patent‟s life as there is insufficient time to resolve an action 
before the expiry of the patent and so the infringing competitor gains 
valuable direct access to the post-expiry market during the life of the 
patent.10  Springboard imagery aptly portrays this reality. 
                                                          
8 See for example Gerber Garment Technology v. Lectra System Ltd., [1995] R.P.C. 
383 at 393 (Pat. Ct.) [Gerber Garment Technology], where Jacob J. accepted that the 
patentee lost sales of its formerly patented product because the defendant‟s 
infringement enabled it to accelerate its entry into market.  
9 Act, supra note 1, s.55.01. 
10 Baker Hughes Inc. v. Galvanic Analytical Systems Ltd. (1991), 37 C.P.R. (3d) 512 at 
515 (F.C.T.D.). 
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In American jurisprudence, this same act is often referred to 
as accelerated market entry. Though both terms are appropriate, this 
more general American term will be used herein. Although 
infringement just before the end of the patent may have significantly 
more impact than it would earlier in the patent life, the issue is one of 
post-expiry loss due to an accelerated market entry.  The effect of an 
infringement, regardless of when it occurred, on post-expiry market 
share is one of degree and therefore should not be dismissed merely 
because it does not fit the metaphor of a springboard.  An infringer 
late in the life of a patent may well gain a springboard into the post-
expiry market.  However, an earlier infringer nonetheless will likely 
gain some benefit, even if minimal. 
Part II of this paper sets out the remedies available to 
patentees.  As this paper focuses on the recoverability of damages for 
and prevention of loss occurring post expiry, only damages and 
injunctions are truly relevant.  Since successful patent infringement 
actions typically give rise to a permanent injunction,11 no further 
discussion of that remedy is necessary.  However, interlocutory 
injunctions are particularly relevant to this issue, in particular since 
patent infringement actions are frequently quite long and may be 
decided only after the patent expires, thus rendering the availability 
of a permanent injunction futile.  Part III analyzes the law on 
recovery of post-expiry losses and sets out the case in favour of such 
recovery.  Part IV examines the availability of interlocutory 
injunctions in springboarding cases. 
 
II 
DAMAGES AND INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS IN PATENT LAW 
Before addressing whether post-expiry loss can be remedied or 
springboarding can be prevented, it is instructive to set out some of 
the remedies available to patentees.  Upon the court declaring a patent 
to be infringed, the patentee may claim a variety of remedies, 
including damages, an accounting of profits, an injunction or 
delivery-up.12  Prior to successfully establishing infringement, the 
                                                          
11 The statutory basis for this remedy is found in the Act, supra note 1, s.57(1). 
12 Act, supra note 1, ss.55, 57. 
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patentee may also apply for interlocutory relief.13 
As the focus of this paper is post-expiry patent damages and 
interlocutory injunctions against springboarding, only damages and 
injunctions will be discussed in more detail. 
 
A.   GENERAL APPROACH TO PATENT REMEDIES 
Although patents are a statutory creature, the principles of 
tort law generally apply and may clarify any legislative gaps.  The 
courts have long recognized that patent infringement is analogous to, 
if not actually, a tort: “every [infringing] sale is a tort.”14  In particular, 
as one author recently pointed out, “damages principles in intellectual 
property cases are generally consistent with a modern understanding 
of general tort principles.”15  The author cited a relatively recent 
English case for the proposition that, as above, “infringement of a 
patent is a statutory tort” and therefore one could expect the damage 
recoverable to be governed by the same rules as in tort law.16 
Therefore it is instructive to review some basic tort law 
principles pertaining to damages and injunctions when addressing 
how these remedies work in the patent context. 
 
B.   DAMAGES 
Damages are meant to compensate the claimant for damage, 
loss or injury suffered,17 and thus place that claimant, in Lord 
Blackburn‟s words, in the “same position as he would have been if he 
had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting 
compensation or reparation.”18  In patent cases, the purpose of an 
                                                          
13 Act, supra note 1, s. 57(1). 
14 J.R.. Short Milling Co. (Canada) Ltd. v. Continental Soya Co. et al. (1942), 2 C.P.R. 
158 at 161 (Ex. Ct.) [J.R. Short Milling]. 
15 Norman Siebrasse et al., Damages Calculations In Intellectual Property Cases in 
Canada (Toronto: Cole & Partners, 2001) at 1. [Siebrasse et al.] 
16 Gerber Garment Technology v. Lectra System Ltd., [1997] R.P.C. 443 at 452, 
Staughton L.J. (C.A.) [Gerber Garment Technology]. 
17 Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (Toronto: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 
para.1-020. 
18 Ibid. at para.1-022.  See also Gerber Garment Technology, supra note 8 at 393 (Pat. 
Ct.).  Lord Blackburn‟s statement has also been adopted in Canadian patent law: 
AlliedSignal Inc. v. Du Pont Canada Inc. (1998), 78 C.P.R. (3d) 129 at para. 19 
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award of damages for infringement has been similarly described as 
seeking to “compensate the plaintiff for any losses suffered by the 
plaintiff as a result of the infringement.”19 
Although accuracy is often impossible and imagination must 
be exercised, an assessment of damages must not be generous because 
damages are meant to compensate, not penalize or punish.20  
Nonetheless, damages are calculated liberally.21  
Two other limiting factors are key in a damages assessment: 
the loss must effectively be caused by the tort 22 and the loss must be 
reasonably foreseeable.23   
A concise framework for assessing tort damages was set out in 
Gerber Garment Technology v. Lectra System Ltd.: 
 
(1)…the overriding principle is that the victim should be 
restored to the position he would have been in if no wrong 
had been done, and (2) …the victim can recover loss which 
was (i) foreseeable, (ii) caused by the wrong, and (iii) not 
excluded from recovery by public or social policy.  The 
requirement of causation is sometimes confused with 
foreseeability, which is remoteness.  The two are 
different…24 
 
Damages awards under patent law differ slightly than under 
tort law because the patents, and associated remedies, are statutory in 
nature.  However, as discussed previously, the underlying principles 
apply in a similar manner. 
                                                                                                                                  
(F.C.T.D.) citing General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., [1976] 
R.P.C. 197 at 212, [1975] All E.R. 173, per Wilberforce L.J(H.L.). 
19 Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Apotex Inc. (2001), 10 C.P.R. (4th) 151 at 156 (Ont. Sup. 
Ct.), as cited in Jay-Lor International Inc. v. Penta Farm Systems Ltd., 2007 FC 358 at 
para.114. 
20 J.R. Short Milling, supra note 14, at 168-169. 
21 Watson Laidlaw Co. Ltd. v. Pott, Cassells and Williamson (1914), 31 R.P.C. 104 at 
117-118 (H.L.). 
22 Schrump v. Koot (1977), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 553 (Ont. C.A.). 
23 Kienzle v. Stringer (1981), 35 O.R. (2d) 85 (Ont. C.A.).  Although Asamera Oil 
Corp. Ltd. v. Sea Oil & General Corp., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 633 dealt with a breach of 
contract, the Supreme Court recognized both the reasonable contemplation test in 
contract law and the reasonable foreseeability test in torts. 
24 Gerber Garment Technology, supra note 16, at 452, Staughton L.J. (C.A.) 
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The starting point for damages in patent actions is section 
55(1) of the Act which imposes liability on infringers “for all damages 
sustained by the patentee…after the grant of the patent, by reason of 
the infringement.”25  The patentee, in addition to demonstrating a 
defendant is liable for infringement, must establish the quantum of 
damages.26 
As with tort claims, causation is central to assessing 
intellectual property damages: “damages are measured by the 
difference between the actual position of the plaintiff and the position 
of the plaintiff but for the actual infringement.”27  Therefore the 
damages a patentee can claim are generally limited to those they can 
establish that will satisfy the but-for test.  This often translates to 
showing that the patentee lost sales due to the defendant‟s 
infringement.28  The causation test has alternatively been stated as 
requiring the plaintiff‟s loss to be “a direct consequence” of the 
defendant‟s infringing activities.29 
However, damages in patent may be more broadly assessed. A 
patentee may also be compensated for infringing sales that they would 
not have made since, as mentioned previously, every sale is a tort.  In 
those cases, the courts will allow damages for an amount equivalent to 
a reasonable royalty.30 
Further, a patentee‟s losses must not be too remote.31  
However, unlike under tort law, this aspect of the analysis may simply 
                                                          
25 Act, supra note 1, s.55(1).  Paragraph (2) specifies that the patentee is also entitled 
to “reasonable compensation” once the patent is “open to public inspection,” but 
before it is granted. 
26 Jay-Lor International Inc. v. Penta Farm Systems Ltd., 2007 FC 358 at para.118 [Jay-
Lor International]. 
27 Siebrasse et al, supra note 15 at 1.  See also Lubrizol Corp. v. Imperial Oil Ltd. 
(1996), 71 C.P.R. (3d) 26 at para. 9 (F.C.A.) [Lubrizol]. 
28 See AlliedSignal Inc. v. Du Pont Canada Inc. (1998), 78 C.P.R. (3d) 129 at para. 32 
(F.C.T.D.) [Allied Signal]:  “The question is whether the plaintiff would have made 
the sales actually made by the defendant, but for the presence of the defendant‟s 
infringing product in the market.”  See also Jay-Lor International, supra note 26, at 
para.123: “In assessing the award, the plaintiff is entitled to the profits on the sales it 
would have made but for the presence of the infringing product in the market.”  See 
also J.R. Short Milling, supra note 14 at 164 (Ex. Ct.). 
29 Randall J. Hofley & Nicholas McHaffie, “Litigation”, in Stikeman Elliott (ed.), 
Intellectual Property Law: Canada (Huntington NY: Juris Publishing, 2002-) at 9-55. 
30 J.R. Short Milling, supra note 14 at 161 (Ex. Ct.). 
31 Lubrizol, supra note 27 at para. 9 (F.C.A.). 
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entail determining whether, despite satisfying the causation 
requirement, the loss should nonetheless be excluded for public or 
social policy reasons.  Foreseeability is rarely a consideration because, 
as Professor Siebrasse notes, “the nature of the typical loss in 
intellectual property cases – lost sales or licensing revenue – is always 
foreseeable.”32  Where the loss is not typical, the court may still assess 
it as foreseeable. 
Although there are various types of losses due to infringement 
– for example, lost profits, loss of market, price depression – damage 
awards are “assessed on two mutually exclusive bases: one being 
damages for lost manufacturing profits, the other being damages for 
loss of royalties.”33  This approach recognizes that a patentee will 
either make the patented invention themselves or will licence the 
right to do so, and the loss stems from one of these situations.   
 
C.   INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS 
The modern test for granting an interlocutory injunction was 
set out in RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General) (“RJR-
MacDonald”): 
 
First, a preliminary assessment must be made of the merits 
of the case to ensure that there is a serious question to be 
tried. Secondly, it must be determined whether the 
applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the application 
were refused. Finally, an assessment must be made as to 
which of the parties would suffer greater harm from the 
granting or refusal of the remedy pending a decision on the 
merits.34 
 
The first branch of the test, the preliminary assessment, 
parallels that stated in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., 
subject to the occasional reversion to a stricter standard.35  The 
                                                          
32 Siebrasse et al, supra note 15 at 2. 
33 Hughes and Clarizio, Hughes and Woodley on Patents, supra note 5 at para. 53. 
34 RJR-MacDonal v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, S.C.J. No. 17 at 
para. 43 [RJR-MacDonald].  
35 Ibid. at para. 44.  At paras. 49-50, Sopinka and Cory JJ. further held that the 
“threshold is a low one.  The judge on the application must make a preliminary 
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preliminary assessment is satisfied where “the claim is not frivolous or 
vexatious; in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried.”   
With respect to irreparable harm, the issue is whether “refusal 
to grant relief could so adversely affect the applicants‟ own interests 
that the harm could not be remedied” if the applicant later won on 
the merits.36 
Irreparable harm “refers to the nature of the harm suffered 
rather than its magnitude. It is harm which either cannot be 
quantified in monetary terms or which cannot be cured.”37  The 
Supreme Court has identified several examples of irreparable harm, 
namely bankruptcy, permanent market loss or irrevocable damage to 
one‟s business reputation.38  Economic harm is therefore clearly 
included within the ambit of irreparable harm.39  It is also important 
to note that quantification and curability are disjunctive, and thus 
harm need not be both unquantifiable and incurable. 
Under the balance of convenience analysis, although “it is a 
counsel of prudence to… preserve the status quo”, “this approach 
would seem to be of limited value in private law cases.”40  
The tripartite interlocutory injunction test set out in RJR-
MacDonald has been accepted in patent cases.41  However, on the first 
branch of the test, the Federal Court Trial Division has noted that the 
court “must look to all the facts showing infringement and decide if 
the applicant requesting interlocutory injunction has a reasonable 
chance of success at trial.”  It mattered not whether one termed the 
question “an arguable case, a prima facie case or a strong prima facie 
case.”42 
As for irreparable harm, there must be “clear and not 
                                                                                                                                  
assessment of the merits of the case” and later that a “prolonged examination of the 
merits is generally neither necessary nor desirable.” 
36 Ibid. at para. 58.  
37 Ibid. at para.59. 
38 Ibid. at para.59. 
39 However, Sopinka and Cory JJ. dismissed the notion that being “forced to spend 
very large sums of money” are monetary losses that “will not usually be[sic]amount to 
irreparable harm in private law cases.”  See Ibid. at para.84. 
40 Ibid. at para.75.  Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 7 at para. 12 (F.C.T.D.). 
41 Bayer Healthcare, supra note 7 at para. 23. 
42 Procter & Gamble Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Canada Inc. (1995), 61 C.P.R. (3d) 160 
at 169 (F.C.T.D.) [Procter & Gamble]. 
   
144 
speculative” evidence that the infringing activity will irreparably 
harm the patentee.43  In addition, it is not sufficient to show a 
probability of irreparable harm; the patentee must establish that this 
harm will occur if the interlocutory injunction is not granted.44  The 
court also confirmed that it is the nature of the harm suffered rather 
than its magnitude which determines irreparability, and, further, 
difficulty in calculating damages is insufficient to establish irreparable 
harm so long as there is some way of reasonably measuring those 
damages.45   
In patent cases, a permanent injunction upon finding that a 
defendant has infringed a patent has become so prevalent that there 
seems to be a presumption in favour of granting such a remedy.  For 
example, Justice Hughes, in his text on Canadian patent law, notes 
that a permanent injunction “normally follows a finding of 
infringement… after trial” and does not even allude to the possibility 
of a permanent injunction not being issued.46  The Act, in fact, 
expressly provides for orders “restraining or enjoining the opposite 
party from further use, manufacture or sale of the subject-matter of 
the patent.”47 
For interlocutory injunctions, however, the contrary seems 
almost to be true.  One commentator claims that “patent infringement 
actions are among the most difficult in which to obtain an 
interlocutory injunction,” largely due to the difficulty of proving 
irreparable damages. The courts are particularly reluctant to prevent 
the defendant from infringing a patent when the validity of the patent 
is challenged or the patent is newly issued.48  This is in stark contrast 
                                                          
43 Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Novopharm Ltd., 2005 FC 815, 40 C.P.R. (4th) 210 at para. 
59 (F.C.T.D.); aff‟d 2005 FCA 390, 44 C.P.R. (4th) 326. 
44 Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 7 at para. 14 (F.C.T.D.). 
45 Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Novopharm Ltd., 2005 FC 815, 40 C.P.R. (4th) 210 at paras. 
60-61 (F.C.T.D.); aff‟d 2005 FCA 390, 44 C.P.R. (4th) 326. 
46 Hughes and Clarizio, Hughes and Woodley on Patents, supra note 5 at para. 53.   
See also Ronald E. Dimock, Intellectual Property Disputes: Resolutions and Remedies, 
looseleaf (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004) vol. 2 at 15-2 [Dimock, Intellectual 
Property Disputes]. 
47 Act, supra note 1, s.57(1). 
48 Dimock, Intellectual Property Disputes, supra note 46 at 15-22.  See also Hughes 
and Clarizio, Hughes and Woodley on Patents, supra note 5 at para. 53: “[I]n patent 
actions the Court has usually stated that any damages sustained may be sufficiently 
compensated in money, and refused interlocutory injunctions.  There is no 
presumption that interlocutory injunctions should not be granted in patent cases; 
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to statements in American Cyanamid, which was widely accepted by 
the Supreme Court in setting out the test for interlocutory 
injunctions, wherein the House of Lords noted that elaborate 
examination procedures to be performed by expert examiners, the 
opportunity for opposition and provision for appeal “make the grant 
of a patent… a good prima facie reason… for supposing the patent to 
be valid.” Therefore interlocutory injunctions in patent cases should 
be governed by the same principles as in other actions.49 
One reason invoked for refusing to order an interlocutory 
injunction is the practice that has developed whereby the defendant 
undertakes to keep an account of the infringing sales.  Where such an 
undertaking is accepted and there is no reason to believe the 
defendant will not be capable of paying the damages that may be 
awarded, damages are likely to be an “adequate remedy” for the 
infringement.50 
Despite the infrequent success of interlocutory injunction 
applications in patent cases, there are no legitimate policy or historic 
reasons for presumptively denying interlocutory injunctions.  Indeed, 
one court has previously held as such: “I simply do not accept that 
there is a presumption that interlocutory injunctions should not be 
granted in patent cases.”51 Another Canadian court echoed the 
American Cyanamid dicta to the effect that the same general 
principles apply in patent cases as in other suits.52  However, to the 
extent that interlocutory injunctions are denied due to the nature of 
the wrong and the harm that ensues, this judicial reluctance may well 
be justified. 
                                                                                                                                  
however, the Courts are reluctant to grant relief unless there is a hearing of full 
evidence.”  See also Allergan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc. (1985), 7 
C.P.R. (3d) 209 at 214 (F.C.T.D.).  See also Wellcome Foundation Ltd. v. Interpharm 
Inc. (1992), 41 C.P.R. (3d) 215 at 225 (F.C.T.D.). 
49 American Cyanamid v. Ethicon, [1975] AC 396 (HL). 
50 Cutter Ltd. v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories of Canada Ltd. (1980), 47 C.P.R. (2d) 53 
at 55-56 (F.C.A.).   
51 Samsonite Corp. v. Holiday Luggage Inc. (1988), 20 C.P.R. (3d) 291 at 309, 21 
C.I.P.R. 286, 9 A.C.W.S. (3d) 440 (F.C.T.D.). 
52 Proctor & Gamble v. Nabisco Brands Ltd./Nabisco Brands Ltee (1984), 82 C.P.R. 
(2d) 224 at 225, [1984] 2 F.C. 475 (T.D.) 




POST-EXPIRY PATENT DAMAGES 
 
A.   TRADITIONAL CANADIAN APPROACH 
Participants in patent cases, be they parties or judges, often 
presume that damages are limited to the term of the patent.  Plaintiffs 
seeking to enforce their patent rights often claim damages only in 
respect of infringing acts until the date the patent expires.53  Courts 
will generally limit recovery to this same period.  A particularly apt 
example of this approach is the following statement by the Federal 
Court: “The damages or loss of profits are limited, I assume, to the 
date of expiration of the patent.”54  In the Federal Court of Appeal, in 
assessing an application for an interlocutory injunction for 
springboarding, the court held that losses arising after the expiry of 
the patent due to increased competition linked to infringements 
occurring during the term of the patent were irrelevant. “Protection 
beyond the expiry of the patent is not something to which the 
patentee is entitled under the patent.”55 
Further, Justice Hughes, in his widely used text on Canadian 
patent law, implicitly suggests that post-expiry damages are not 
recoverable when, in discussing the timeframes for recovery, he notes 
that “an accumulation of damages and reasonable compensation as 
remedies could be calculated over a period of up to 18½ years.”56 The 
number of years set out by Justice Hughes equals the period from the 
time the patent is published to its expiry, in other words it reflects the 
life of the patent.  However, Justice Hughes later recognizes the 
possibility of awarding damages for future losses, though it is unclear 
whether such losses include those beyond the term of the patent.57  
                                                          
53 See for example Quadco Equipment Inc. v. Timberjack Inc., 2002 FCT 96 at para. 8. 
54 Xerox Canada Ltd. v. IBM Canada Ltd. (1977), 33 C.P.R. (2d) 24, F.C.J. No. 603 at 
para. 121 (F.C.T.D.). 
55 Cutter Ltd. v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories of Canada Ltd. (1980), 47 C.P.R. (2d) 53 
at 57 (F.C.A.).  Thurlow C.J, for the majority, also explicitly held that the 
springboarding evidence in that case was “purely speculative”. 
56 Hughes and Clarizio, Hughes and Woodley on Patents, supra note 5 at para. 54. 
57 Ibid at para. 53. 
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B.   THE CASE FOR POST-EXPIRY PATENT DAMAGES 
In so far as Canadian courts are reluctant to award damages to 
patentees for losses occurring beyond the life of the patent, Canada 
seems to lag behind English counterparts. 
The trial58 and appeal59 decisions in Gerber Garment 
Technology Inc. v. Lectra Systems Ltd. are the leading English cases 
on springboarding and post-expiry patent losses.  At trial, the 
defendant was held to have infringed the plaintiff‟s patent and an 
inquiry into damages ensued.  Jacob J. approved of damage awards for 
ancillary losses, including post-expiry losses, holding that failure to 
recompense the plaintiff for foreseeable ancillary losses whose source 
and origin are wrongful acts of infringement might encourage, where 
the benefit is large enough, competitors to infringe patented products, 
in particular jurisdictions where exemplary or punitive damages 
unavailable.  Jacob J. dismissed the claims that such damages awards 
widen the ambit of the patentee‟s monopoly as it merely involves an 
inquiry into the effect of the invasion of the patentee‟s existing 
monopoly.  Jacob J. further rejected the argument that the losses are 
too remote because “economic damage is as a practical matter bound 
to follow from the infringement.” 60 
Jacob J. then held that secondary losses, including post-expiry 
damages, were recoverable “provided that secondary loss is a 
foreseeable consequence of the infringement” and the patentee can 
establish that “such loss…results from the infringer establishing a 
business pre-expiry.  In all these cases, it remains critical that the 
patentee establish the factual basis: that his loss is caused by the 
infringement and foreseeably so.”61 
Staughton L.J., for a unanimous Court of Appeal on this point, 
affirmed the trial decision, but focused more on the wording of the 
Act itself.  He held that the words “in respect of the infringement” did 
not limit a patentee to damages on “activities of the infringer that…in 
                                                          
58 Gerber Garment Technology, supra note 8 (Pat. Ct.). 
59 Gerber Garment Technology, supra note 16 (C.A.). 
60 Gerber Garment Technology, supra note 8 at 400 (Pat. Ct.). 
61 Ibid at 402 (Pat. Ct.).  At 403, Jacob J. then declined to set out the nature of the 
foreseeability test. 
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themselves constitute infringements.”62  Expanding on this notion, he 
held that 
 
the Patent Act is aimed at protecting patentees from 
commercial loss resulting from the wrongful infringement 
of their rights.  That is only a slight gloss upon the wording 
of the statute itself.  In my judgement, again as a matter of 
first impression, it does not distinguish between profit on 
the sale of patented articles and profit on the sale of 
convoyed goods.63 
 
Staughton L.J. concluded that, in that case, there was no 
dispute as to causation or remoteness, nor any ground of policy for 
restricting the patentee‟s right to recover, and thus the appeal, in so 
far as it sought to restrict the scope of recovery, should be dismissed.64  
Although this quotation focuses on convoyed goods, the logic is 
equally applicable to losses occurring after the expiry of the patent, in 
particular in light of the fact that this case dealt with such damages. 
Therefore, English law clearly recognizes the recoverability of 
losses occurring after the expiry of the patent.  The question is 
whether Canada‟s laws are amenable to such an approach. 
Returning to first principles, the patentee must be 
compensated for the losses he or she suffered that are caused by the 
infringement and are not too remote.  Although the question must be 
addressed based on the facts of each case, there does not seem to be 
any legal or logical bar to recovery.  
With respect to causation, it seems clear that an infringement 
occurring during the life of the patent may cause lost sales after the 
patent expires.  Stated simply, the argument goes as follows: the 
infringement allows the competitor to establish their business prior to 
the end of the patent, allowing this competitor to accelerate its market 
entry and increasing the number of sales that the patentee will lose 
upon expiry of the patent.  In other words, but for the infringement, 
                                                          
62 Gerber Garment Technology, supra note 16 at 451, Staughton L.J. (C.A.). 
63 Ibid at 453, Staughton L.J. (C.A.).  This first impression was confirmed later in the 
judgment by a review of the case law revealing no rules barring damages on activities 
other than the actual infringement.  
64 Ibid at 456, Staughton L.J. (C.A.) 
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the patentee would have enjoyed a larger market share and therefore 
more sales. 
As to remoteness, a patentee‟s loss of sales is, as mentioned 
previously, almost always entirely foreseeable and this applies with 
equal force to losses after the life of the patent.  Further, instigating 
such loss of sales may be the only true reason a competitor would 
infringe a patent, other than the belief that it is not actually 
infringing, since the competitor is not entitled to profit from its 
infringing activities and therefore can only hope to gain some benefit 
once those activities no longer infringe. 
Therefore, applying basic damages principles, losses occurring 
post expiry should be recoverable.  One may argue that the future loss 
aspect is too speculative.  However, future losses have already been 
recognized in Canadian patent law, as was noted above.  Other 
commentators have gone even further, claiming that “[d]amages can 
also be awarded for prospective losses, as the consequences of the 
infringement may continue for some time after the infringement has 
been stopped.”65  Though the term „prospective‟ connotes a higher 
degree of speculation than may be proper, the notion that a patentee 
may be compensated for losses that have not yet occurred is correct.  
In assessing future losses, the court will simply “make an estimate as 
to what are the chances that a particular thing will or would have 
happened and reflect those chances … in the amount of damages 
which it awards.”66 
The true question for post-expiry losses is whether the 
evidence supports a finding that losses occurring subsequent to the 
end of the patent were caused by infringing activity.  This question 
can no longer be simply dismissed on the old assumption that 
patentees can only recover for infringing activities that occurred 
during the life of the patent. 
Another argument can be raised that the Act specifies when 
damages will be awarded, thus supplanting the general damages 
                                                          
65 Randall J. Hofley & Nicholas McHaffie, “Litigation”, in Stikeman Elliott (ed.), 
Intellectual Property Law: Canada (Huntington NY: Juris Publishing, 2002-) at 9-55. 
See also Siebrasse et al, supra note 15 at 16:  “In principle, damages encompass a loss of 
future profits on sales that, but for the infringement, would have been made after the 
date of the trial.” 
66 Mallet v. McMonagle, [1970] A.C. 166 at 176, as cited in Gerber Garment 
Technology, supra note 8 at 395 (Pat. Ct.). 
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principles, and that it in no way provides for compensation to the 
patentee for losses suffered after the patent expires.  This argument 
can be disposed of in two ways.  First, as mentioned previously, an 
infringement is akin to a statutory tort and therefore general damages 
principles inform the analysis. To the extent that the Act overlaps the 
principles, which is quite rare, those principles are displaced.  
However, the act does not make reference to how damages are to be 
assessed.  Nor does it specify the extent to which damages apply 
beyond setting out when they are triggered, namely an infringing 
activity. 
Second, the Act, by not restricting compensation to the 
infringing act itself, does entitle the patentee to compensation for 
losses beyond the patent‟s life.  As mentioned previously, the Act 
makes a person infringing a patent liable to the patentee “for all 
damages sustained by the patentee … by reason of the infringement”67 
(emphasis added).  On its face, this statutorily imposed liability is 
extremely broad.  Nothing in the words of the provision limits 
damages to the direct loss due to the infringing activity, for example, 
the loss of a sale due to the sale of an infringing product.  The wording 
is also quite similar, in terms of its broadness, to that used in the 
United Kingdom, where post-expiry damages have been awarded. 
Despite the reluctance to assess losses occurring after the 
expiry of the patent, the scope of patent damages has been very 
liberally stated at times.  One commentator claimed that “damages 
seek to compensate the plaintiff for any losses suffered by the plaintiff 
as a result of the infringement” 68 (emphasis added).  Again, this 
statement suggests a broader entitlement to relief than merely 
damages directly caused by the infringing activity. 
In AlliedSignal, the court held that the plaintiff is entitled to 
compensation for “all damages flowing from infringement of the 
patent within Canada, which may include profits lost on sales outside 
Canada” 69 (emphasis added).  If a Canadian patent right can be 
understood to include damages occurring within Canada triggered by 
lost sales outside of Canada, it should be legitimate to conclude that 
the time-limited patent right allows recovery for losses occurring after 
                                                          
67 Act, supra note 1, s.55(2). 
68 Hughes and Clarizio, Hughes and Woodley on Patents, supra note 5 at para. 53.   
69 Allied Signal, supra note 28 at para. 33 (F.C.T.D.). 
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the patent term triggered by infringements occurring within the 
appropriate time frame. 
One Canadian author thought it clear that the patentee is 
entitled to damages for losses occurring after the end of the patent: 
 
Should this be considered as an encroachment on the 
principle that damages must be “caused” by the wrong 
(causation) and should not be remote (foreseeability, 
remoteness).  Damages must result from the infringement 
but the result may create to the right owner, damages 
greater than the value of the articles that infringes.  For 
example, a fault may cause damages greater than the articles 
destroyed, taking into account the need for causation and 
foreseeability.  If a baker carries on business on an island 
and his bridge, his only way out of the island, is destroyed 
through the fault of another, should the defendant be liable 
for the value of the bridge only or also for the business lost 
by the baker while he was unable to deliver his goods?  The 
answer is self-evident.70 
 
B.   EMERGING SIGNS OF CHANGE 
Recently, a shift toward recognizing post-expiry losses seems 
to be occurring, though no court has awarded damages for such losses.  
The clearest signal came in Bayer Healthcare., where Justice 
Mactavish, though not required to decide this issue, reviewed recent 
Canadian and English law and held that the possibility of recovering 
post-expiry damages could not be dispelled: 
 
Damages in patent cases are intended to put the plaintiff in 
the position that it would have been in, but for the 
infringement.  It is, in my view, entirely speculative for 
Bayer to say at this point that it will not be able to recover 
damages for any losses that it may suffer in the post-expiry 
period, as a matter of law, and indeed there is authority for 
the proposition that such damages are indeed recoverable.71 
 
                                                          
70 Dimock, Intellectual Property Disputes, supra note 46 at 17-7.   
71 Bayer Healthcare, supra note 7 at para, 56. 
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The federal court has also made suggestive comments to the 
same effect:  
 
[D]amages will be calculated in reasonable fashion, 
providing a normal remedy for infringement, if the trial 
finds that to have occurred, whether those are caused 
before or after expiry of the plaintiffs‟ patent.72 
 
In both those cases, the court held that damages in the post-
expiry period were quantifiable.73  In the latter case, the court 
supported its conclusion by pointing to the evidence of experts to 
satisfy itself that any loss of market, regardless of whether the 
defendant entered the market before or after the expiry of the patent, 
could be calculated and that loss could be quantified in damages.74 
 
C.   CONCLUSION 
Sound arguments founded in both general damages principles 
and a closer reading of the Act itself, as well as recent case law 
questioning the old assumption that a patentee may claim 
compensation only for losses incurred during the life of the militate 
against dismissing  out of hand a patentee‟s entitlement to damages for 
post-expiry losses.  Where the evidence in a case supports the 
conclusion that losses occurring after the patent ends were caused by 
an infringing activity during the life of the patent, the award of 




When granting an interlocutory injunction, the court must, 
                                                          
72 Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 7 at para. 22.  At para. 29, MacKay J. also 
obliquely states that “an award of damages or an accounting of profits may indirectly 
compensate, at least in part, any loss to the plaintiffs arising from reduction in the 
overall NH market,” which seems to have included market loss after the patent 
expires.  The former dicta was approved of in Bayer Healthcare, supra note 7 at para. 
57. 
73 Bayer Healthcare, supra note 7 at para, 58.  Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 7 at 
para. 19. 
74 Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 7 at para. 21. 
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among other things, determine that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable 
harm.  This has often been the hurdle patentees have stumbled over 
when seeking an interlocutory injunction.  In light of the conclusion 
above that losses occurring after a patent ends are recoverable, can it 
truly be said that a defendant springboarding into the post-expiry 
market irreparably harms the patentee? 
 
A.   RELUCTANCE TO GRANT INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS IN PATENT 
ACTIONS 
As mentioned previously, interlocutory injunctions are rarely 
granted in patent actions.  This may very well extend to sprinboarding 
activities. 
In the most recent patent action75 to address springboarding, 
Bayer Healthcare Mactavish J. confirmed that interlocutory 
injunctions will seldom be ordered in patent cases on the basis of a 
defendant‟s springboarding activity.  In light of her conclusions that 
post-expiry damages are of a quantifiable nature and potentially 
recoverable, Mactavish J. declined to order the injunction because 
irreparable harm had not been established.76  More specifically, 
Mactavish J. held that the plaintiff‟s evidence did not support a 
finding that the damages were unquantifiable,77 that permanent 
market loss would result due to the infringement,78 or that the 
defendant‟s head start in the market would prevent the plaintiff from 
growing their business or making an orderly transition to a post-
expiry reality.79 
The Federal Court had come to a very similar conclusion in 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. et al. v. Apotex Inc.  In that case, the 
plaintiffs were made aware of the defendant‟s intention to sell their 
                                                          
75 Bayer Healthcare, supra note 7. 
76 Ibid. at paras. 51-58. 
77 Ibid. at paras. 59-60. 
78 Ibid. at paras. 61-64. This point is discussed under the heading of Special Industry 
Consideration, but the argument essentially goes that generics generally overtake the 
market immediately upon the expiry of patents, and thus the infringement is not the 
cause of the post-expiry losses. 
79 Ibid. at paras. 66-86.  The evidence suggested, for example, at para. 75-78, that 
Sandoz might not purchase the generic version of the drug due to organizational 
buying procedures, and, at para. 82, that hospital pharmacists would nonetheless 
select the plaintiff‟s product if both version were available. 
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patented pharmaceutical product prior to the expiry of the patent and 
thus launched an action for infringement and sought a quia timet 
interlocutory injunction.  The motion was denied.80  As mentioned 
previously, MacKay J. first held that post-expiry damages were 
quantifiable.81  MacKay J. also referred to the possibility of the 
defendant not paying the damages awarded against them as 
“speculative as best.”82  Finally, MacKay J. disposed of the plaintiff‟s 
third claim, that it will suffer a decline in its total market share, 
primarily due to a lack of evidence. This is an inherent difficulty in 
establishing irreparable harm for springboarding interlocutory 
injunctions: 
 
Although the plaintiffs argue it will not make "good 
business sense" to continue promotion of its NH product, 
they have failed, in my view, to demonstrate that there will 
be a shrinking market caused by Apotex' entry on the 
market or that this would constitute irreparable harm as 
defined in RJR-MacDonald , supra . In my opinion, any 
decline in the overall market for NH, and any harm 
resulting therefrom, is purely speculative, at this stage. It 
might well be caused, at least in part, by any decision of the 
plaintiffs to decrease sales promotion, if that course be 
taken, rather than solely by Apotex' entry into the market. 
On the other hand, if the plaintiffs were to continue 
promoting their product, this might result in an increased 
volume of combined sales for both the plaintiffs and 
Apotex. Moreover, if Apotex is found to infringe the 
plaintiffs' patent at trial, an award of damages or an 
accounting of profits may indirectly compensate, at least in 
part, any loss to the plaintiffs arising from reduction in the 
overall NH market.  
 
The courts easily reject as speculation any potential damage 
                                                          
80 Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 7 at paras. 31. 
81 Ibidi. at paras. 17-23. It must be noted that MacKay J. never explicitly claimed that 
these damages were recoverable.  As seen earlier, he merely stated, at para. 22, that 
damages, including post-expiry damages, would be “calculated in a reasonable 
fashion, providing a normal remedy for infringement” or, at para.29, that market loss, 
apparently including after the patent expires, might be “indirectly compensate[d], at 
least in part.”  
82 Ibid. at para. 24.  
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that would arise after the patent expires, most likely due to the near 
impossibility of accurately predicting the quantum of damages or even 
identifying its precise nature, yet they also maintain that these post-
expiry damages are quantifiable, even if with difficulty. 
 
B.   PRECEDENT FOR PREVENTING SPRINGBOARDING 
However, there is precedent for ordering an interlocutory 
injunction to prevent an infringing competitor from springboarding.  
In Procter & Gamble Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Canada Inc., the 
plaintiff attempted to prevent the defendant from entering the market 
prior to the patent‟s expiry.  Teitlebaum J. granted a rare interlocutory 
injunction for springboarding, holding that the evidence presented by 
the plaintiffs, uncontradicted by the defendants, established there was 
a “very serious potential that plaintiffs will lose some market share.”  
More specifically, the “jump start” the defendants would obtain would 
make it the “second most „dominant player‟” and thus put them in “a 
position to take a market share which would adversely affect the 
plaintiff‟s.”83  
Significantly, Teitlebaum J. followed dicta from RJR-
MacDonald to the effect that “permanent market loss” is irreparable 
harm.84  As with the more recent cases, the issue then revolves around 
the quality of the evidence, which the judge found lacking for the 
defendant.  The plaintiff‟s evidence here established that programs to 
protect the plaintiff‟s market for that product, such as brand loyalty 
programs, would be stymied85 and that allowing one competitor to 
enter the market would significantly increase competition both 
during the term of the patent and immediately after because it may 
encourage others to do the same.86 
In Carbo Ceramics Inc. v. China Ceramics Proppant Ltd.87 
(Carbo Ceramics), Shore J. addressed two different irreparable harm 
arguments: inability to pay damages and springboarding.  On the 
                                                          
83 Procter & Gamble, supra note 42 at 177-178 (F.C.T.D.).  
84 See however Bayer Healthcare, supra note 7 at paras. 61-63, which clearly 
distinguished this dicta in the context of pharmaceutical patents. 
85 Procter & Gamble, supra note 42 at 175-177 (F.C.T.D.).  
86  Procter & Gamble, supra note 42 at 175 (F.C.T.D.).  
87 Carbo Ceramics Inc. v. China Ceramics Proppant Ltd. (2004), 34 C.P.R. (4th) 423 
(F.C.) [Carbo Ceramics]. 
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evidence, the former was easily demonstrated and thus irreparable 
harm was established.88  With respect to the latter, Shore J. noted that 
the defendant‟s entry into the market late in the life of the patent 
clearly raised the issue of springboarding. Even more damning was the 
fact that the defendant sold the infringing product to one of the 
plaintiff‟s clients, who then virtually stopped buying that product 
from the plaintiff.89  Shore J. then concluded that the defendant was 
springboarding, and therefore obtained “an advantage for which an 
award of damages would be insufficient.”90  Shore J. thus explicitly 
recognized that springboarding itself provides an advantage that 
irreparably harms the patentee.  The interlocutory injunction was 
therefore granted.91  
The result in Carbo Ceramics was affirmed on appeal.  
However the Court of Appeal ignored the fact that springboarding 
was addressed at the irreparable harm stage and examined it within 
the context of the balance of convenience.  Letourneau J.A., for a 
unanimous court, held that springboarding was a factor that might 
sway a neutral balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff.92  
Although addressing springboarding at a different step of the analysis, 
the Court of Appeal nonetheless recognized that such infringing 
activity would cause the defendant to “suffer a loss of part of the 
market likely to endure after the expiry of the patent, as well as a 
disadvantage for which an award of damages would be insufficient.”93  
                                                          
88 Ibid. at paras. 22-28 (F.C.). 
89 Ibid. at paras. 30-31 (F.C.). 
90 Ibid. at para. 32 (F.C.). 
91 Ibid. at paras. 36, 33-35, 18-20 (F.C.). At paras. 18-20 and 33-35, Shore J. also held 
that a serious issue was established and that the balance of convenience favoured the 
status quo, which was held to be prior to the infringement.  The full test for an 
interlocutory injunction was therefore satisfied. 
92 Carbo Ceramics Inc. v. China Ceramics Proppant Ltd. (2004), 34 C.P.R. (4th) 431 at 
para. 8 (F.C.A.) [Carbo Ceramics].  Springboarding effectively tips the balance of 
convenience in that it sets the status quo at a pre-infringement period.  This is clearly 
articulated by Letourneau J.A., at para. 12: “To accept the appellant's contention that 
the status quo should be fixed at the time at which the injunction was sought would 
be to allow the appellant not only to continue the alleged infringements, but also to 
carry on its alleged „springboarding‟ with the blessings of the Court.” 
93 Ibid. at para. 8 (F.C.A.).  Springboarding effectively tips the balance of convenience 
in that it sets the status quo at a pre-infringement period.  This is clearly articulated 
by Letourneau J.A., at para. 12: “To accept the appellant's contention that the status 
quo should be fixed at the time at which the injunction was sought would be to allow 
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Clearly, therefore, the springboarding that occurred in this case fell 
within the definition of irreparable harm.  Further, as Letourneau J.A. 
never addressed the issue of irreparable harm prior to affirming the 
decision to grant the interlocutory injunction, the Court of Appeal 
implicitly accepted the trial judge‟s conclusion that springboarding 
produces irreparable harm. 
Cullen J., in Baker Hughes Inc. v. Galvanic Analytical Systems 
Ltd., linked springboarding with irreparable harm in a slightly 
different manner.  Although expressly recognizing that the 
“defendant will therefore obtain an additional period, or springboard, 
into the market-place to the irreparable harm of the plaintiff,”94 Culen 
J. also noted that “years of sales of the patented product have enabled 
the plaintiff to establish a reputation for itself and the product which 
would … suffer „irreparable harm‟ … if the defendant were able to 
continue sales of its product.”95  Cullen J. is clearly suggesting, without 
explanation, that eroding the reputation developed during the term of 
the patent prior to the expiry of the patent leads to irreparable harm. 
 
C.   CONCLUSION 
The weight of the case law currently militates against granting 
a request for an interlocutory injunction to prevent springboarding 
activities.  This difficulty is compounded by the strong argument, and 
possibly the emerging trend towards, recognizing the legitimacy of 
awarding damages for losses occurring after the patent expires.  Since 
applicants for interlocutory injunctions must show that they will be 
irreparably harmed if the infringing activity is allowed to continue, 
recognition of post-expiry damages would severely impair their 
capacity to do so since damages for post-expiry market loss would 
seem to be adequate.  Nothing prevents the applicant, however, from 
arguing that special conditions apply, such as a defendant‟s incapacity 
to pay a damages award. 
                                                                                                                                  
the appellant not only to continue the alleged infringements, but also to carry on its 
alleged „springboarding‟ with the blessings of the Court.” 
94 Baker Hughes, supra note 10 at 515 (F.C.T.D.). 
95 Ibid. at 516 (F.C.T.D.).  Cullen J. also noted that “damages will not suffice for the 
protection lost under the patent, the need to find a new distributor, the actual 
locating of a new distributor, and the new distributor's claim and the plaintiff's claim 
that the product infringes.” 
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There is, however, case law to suggest that springboarding, 
due to the market loss that ensues, irreparably harms the patentee.  So 
long as this market loss is permanent, this is consistent with explicit 
statements from the Supreme Court.  In addition, the federal court has 
also suggested that losing the opportunity to develop, or maintain, the 
company‟s or product‟s reputation during the life of the patent 
irreparably harms the patentee. 
It is clear therefore that the question of irreparable harm 
should not be dismissed out of hand by the courts.  Again, the 
question should be addressed on the evidence in each case.  
Admittedly, it may be difficult to identify evidence which establishes 
irreparable harm, especially if post-expiry losses are recoverable.  In 
particular, certain industries may have more difficulty establishing 
such harm than others.  One industry that may face considerable 
difficulty when seeking an interlocutory injunction to prevent 
springboarding is the pharmaceutical industry.  The Federal Court has 
previously commented that 
 
given the unique dynamic of the pharmaceutical 
industry…, it is predictable that as soon as a patent expires, 
the innovator of the drug in question will lose a substantial 
portion of its market share to generic competitors, without 
any realistic expectation that the innovator company will 
be able to recover that market share in the future.96 
 
Therefore, since the patentee would almost immediately lose 
its market in any event, the springboarding would not cause 
irreparable harm. 
Other industries, however, may find the task much less 
arduous.  Some high technology industry participants, for example, 
depend strongly on “convincing customers to be early adopters” to 
ensure “continued customer loyalty,” thus providing the successful 
company with a “broad base of benefits” subsequent to adoption.97  
Therefore loss of these early adopters may in fact lead to permanent 
market loss.  
                                                          
96 Bayer Healthcare, supra note 7 at para. 63. 
97 Siebrasse et al, supra note 15 at 1. 





It is clear that a patentee derives a benefit from a patent even 
after it expires and therefore may be harmed post-expiry by acts 
committed during the life of the patent.  A defendant found liable for 
infringement must compensate the patentee, in appropriate 
circumstances, for all reasonably foreseeable losses caused by the 
infringement, including those occurring after the patent expires.  
Although it is generally assumed that only losses occurring during the 
term of a patent are recoverable, nothing in the Act itself precludes 
recovery for losses suffered beyond its expiry.  As patent infringement 
is analogous to a tort, tort liability rules are applicable and well-suited 
to assess damages in patent infringement cases.  Concerns of unlimited 
liability are answered by applying the well-understood tort law 
concepts of causation and remoteness.  The recoverability of post-
expiry patent losses therefore becomes primarily an evidentiary issue, 
namely whether the losses, typically loss of sales, actually flow from 
the original infringement.  Recent Canadian case law has in fact 
signalled a willingness to consider the recoverability of post-expiry 
patent losses, and at least one English court has granted relief for such 
losses.   
Accordingly, the issuance of interlocutory injunctions to 
prevent patent infringement may become even less frequent.  
Interlocutory injunctions were already seldom granted because of 
judicial reluctance to characterize losses arising from patent 
infringement as irreparable.  In rare cases, infringers have been 
restrained from attempting to gain accelerated entry into the market 
after the patent expires.  However, even then the courts have been 
reluctant to explicitly hold that the losses from the infringement itself 
were irreparable.  Other factors, such as permanent market loss or 
damage to reputation, often motivated the final decision. 
 Accepting that post-expiry losses are recoverable further 
limits the possibility of obtaining interlocutory relief to prevent 
accelerated market entry by requiring the court to consider only 
special circumstances, such as the plaintiff‟s potential bankruptcy, 
rather than merely the post-expiry losses.  In certain cases, for 
example in the high technology industry where early adopters are key 
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to a business‟ success, special circumstances may militate in favour of a 
finding that irreparable harm will ensue.  However, it is more likely 
that patentees will seldom successfully argue that losses occurring 
after the patent expires are inadequately compensated by damages 
precisely because they can recover those losses in court should the 
injunction not issue. 
 
